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After25 years ofdiscussion, theEuropean Community in 1994
finallyagreed upona Directive on information and consultation of
employees within Community-scale undertakings, theEWC-
Directive? TheDirective introduced a system in which it may take
manyyearsbefore a European Works Council in a company isfinal-
lyestablished. Now. tenyears later, .the timehascometo makea first
evaluation of theeffectiveness of theDirective, Thisarticle ispartly
based on thecountry reports published in thisJournal onAustria,
Belgium, Germany and theNetherlands.
1. History
History on a national level
Works councils were invented in.Germany at the end of the nine-
teenthcentury, soon followed by other countries such as Italy and
the Netherlands.3 "Enligthened" employers created voluntarily
bodies with representatives of employees, in order to inform and
consult them on developments in thefactory, They were either led
by the progressive wish to improve communication with workers
in their expanding enterprises, or, less idealistic, just wanted to
keep the unions outof their factory. In 1920 Germany was also
among the first to impose works councils statutorily on enterpris-
es in the "Betriebsrategesetz" (WorksCouncils Act), after World
War II replaced by the "Betriebsverfassungsgesetz" (Work
Constitution Act 1952). Other Europeancountries were inspired.
by the German example: works councils-> under different names
and with·various compositions andcompetences '- were made
obJigatoryby statute in Luxemburg, Austria (both around the
same time), Norway (1920, but not effective), Czechoslovakia
(1921), France (1938/1944), Belgium (1948), the Netherlands
(1950), Hungary (1956); they were introduced by nationwide
agreements in Italy (1943, restoring the pre-fascist tradition),
Sweden (1946) and Denmark (1947). This legislation introduced
a second channel next to the negotiations with the trade-unions
for collective agreements on primary working conditions. In most
countries the works councils first were opposed by the unions,
but later accepted by them and used to obtain more influence
on the shop level.The works councils mainly deal with working
conditions on the plant level, fringe benefits etc.
The next tendency to promote works councils was the "demo-
cratic revolution" ofthe 1960s. This was translated into extended
"Industrial Democracy" throughout Europe: works councils were
established (Norway 1966), or obtained extended rights (Den-
mark 1965/1970, Italy1966,Sweden 1967, France 1968/1982, the
Netherlands 1971/1979, Germany 1972, Austria 1974, Luxemburg
1974/1979).4Finland mentioned in 1978 in its legislation the pos-
sibility to agree on the establishment of a council. Democratising
countries embraced the concept of works councils (Portugal 1977,
Spain 1980, Greece 1988) or renewed their legislation on the topic
(Hungary 1992). Besides these "general" works councils many
countries also know various committees composed of employees'
representatives for specific purposes, for instance health and safe-
ty matters, as well as various forms of Joint committees between
employer and employees' representatives, both falling outside the
scope of this article.5
In all countries with statutory works councils, they are (at least
partly) elected by the employees (albeit that the unions may pro-
pose candidates). The same goes for Norway. But in the other
countries where works councils are based on agreements
(Denmark, Italy and Sweden), the works councils are entirely
composed by the unions, reflecting the relatively strong position
of the unions in those countries. These countries approach the
Anglo-American "one-channel systems" the most.
Ireland and Great Britain lack almost. any tradition of works
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councils," They maintain a centuries-long tradition of unionism.
At the beginning of the twentieth century they followed the
Danish example by building up a one-channel system of employ-
ees' representation on the work floor by shop stewards of the
union. In the United Kingdom, before World War II some types of
works councils existed, but after the war they disappeared. As in
the United States, unions andernployers in these countries are
equally used to adversiallabour relations, in which the underlying
principle is a complete independence of union and employer who
only meet at the bargaining table. Nevertheless, the Irish
Government shows itself since 1974 to be in favour of the concept
of works councils, based on voluntary agreements between
employers and unions and in some enterprises this system
functions. Even in Labour circles in Great Britain discussions are
held on the desirability of introducing works councils.7
History on a European level
Before the introductionof the EvVC-Directiveattempts to create
international rules to protect employees' interests in multinational
enterprises failed.s Codes of conduct were promotedwithout suc-
cess by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (1972),
and introduced by the OECD·(1976)9 and ILO (1977),10however
with marginal practical results. 11
From the very beginning of the European Community in 1957
it was suggested to introduce employee participation on a
European level, but firstly in the framework of Company Law.
The proposals for the introduction of a European Company
(Societas Europaea, SE), included in 1970 the establishment ofa
European Works Council. It was this issue that kept the discussion
going for years. Only after the European Works Council Directive
was introduced, was it possible to regulate the European
Company as well.
Yet,obligations to inform and consult employees' representa-
tives on specific issues were introduced in Directives regarding
Collective Redundancies (1975), Transfer of Undertakings (1977)
and Health and Safety (1989).12The impact of these obligations
on European Law was already noted when the European Court of
Justice, in June 1994, considered that the United Kingdom had
failed in the transposition of the Directives on Collective
Redundancies and on Transfers of Undertakings. The transpo-
sition failed in this respect that the national legislation did not
foresee the consultation of employee representatives in case the
employer does not have a recognised union. According to the EC},
these two Directives require, in such a situation, nationallegisla-
tion that forces such employers to consult the employees by other
means. 13
But a general system of workers' participation on the European
level had to wait. The Vredeling Proposal of 1980 was heavily
opposed by industry, partly because of the so-called by-pass
option, which included that the overseas management could be
dire<..-1:ly approached by the European Works Council.14But also
labour was divided, asa result of the differences in national
systems. The breakthrough came at the beginning of the 1990s
with the acceptance by the European Trade Union Confederation,
after decades of difficult discussions, of the concept of works
councils as aframework for workers' participation in Europe. IS
The works council Directive of 1994 was also more acceptable
for industry, because not only the "by-pass option" was dropped,
but also more emphasis was put on the freedom to conclude
voluntary agreements on the issue. The pressure exercised by the
European Parliament, the Commission and some other govern-
ments' gave the decisive push towards the acceptance of the
Proposal. 16 Also important was the fact that several MNE's had
already introduced some form of employees' participation on a
European level themselves, either in the form of a European
Works Council or otherwise. 17
6 Thesame goesfor Turkey, but here severalcommitteeson specificpoints are statutorilyobligatory.
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of employees'rights in the event of transfersof undertakings,businessesor parts of businesses,77/187IEEC,11977] OJ L 61/26,replacedby Council Directive2ool/23/EC of
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89/3811EEC, [1989]OJ L 183/89.
13 EC]Judgmentsof 8 June 1994,CasesC-382/92and C-383/92 am/missionv, United Kingdom [1994] ECR1-2461; see Wolf-Dieter Rudolph,ThatchersAlpraum,
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establishmentsin two or more MemberStatesof the EuropeanCommunity.The Community Charter wasadopted byelevenheads of state or governmentof the European
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3. The scope of the Directive
A European Works Council (hereafter: EWC) or an Information
and Consultation Procedure (hereafter: ICP) shall be introduced
in every Community-scale undertaking and every Community-
scale group of undertakings.
A Community-scale undertaking is defined as an undertaking
with at least 1,000 employees within the Member States and at
least 150 employees in each of at least two Member States. A
controlling undertaking and its controlled undertakings together
are seen as a group of undertakings. For a community-scale group
of undertakings the same criteria are applied. The thresholds for
the size of the workforce shall be based on the average number of
employees, including part-time employees, employed during the
previous two years, calculated according to national legislation
and/or practice. The national legislation or practice may only be
used for the calculation method, not to select whether (or which)
part-time employees are included. The English text of the
Directive is not exactly clear on this point, but the French and
German texts are. However, a country could decide to take part-
time employees into account prorata to the amount of their
working hours.
The directive does not define the notion of"employee", except
that part-timers are included. This seems to be less of a problem
than with respect to other social legislation of the Ee, since the
employees are in this Directive treated as a group with collective
rights, rather than as individuala? Nevertheless, it might be
important for the calculation of the thresholds of the workforce
whether the definition of"employee" is to be given in the national
legislation or is common for all Member States.
The notion of"undertaking" is also not clarified in the
Directive. The European Court of Justice was of the opinion, in
the context of other legislation in the social field, that a body
might be regarded as an "undertaking" if it is engaged in econom-
ic activities, even though it is not operating with a view to prof-
it.21 The term "controlling undertaking" is extensively defined in
Article 3 of the Directive.
present, the same goes for undertakings of the MNE's in countries
that are not a member of the EU or a party to the EEA-agree-
ment, like Switzerland, but also non-European countries like the
United States and Japan. And employees of plants in non-
Member States on the European Continent also desire to be
represented in EWe's if their MNE has one. Besides this, foreign
MNE's are free to enter into negotiations with employees'
representatives on the establishment of an information and
consultation procedure.
The establishment of the EWC-Directive has in the meantime
paved the way for further developments in the field of employees'
involvement, with the introduction of a Directive on the role of
employees in the European Company (SE)18 as well as on the
national level.19
2. legal status of the Directive
18•. Directive2001/86/ECof the Councilof 8 October 2001to supplementthe Statuteof the EuropeanCompanywith regardto the roleof employees,. [2001]. OJ L294/22.
19..Dir«tive 2002/14/EC of the EuropeanParlianlerttandof the Councilof 11 March2002establishing a generalframeworkforirtforrningand wnsultingemploycesin the
EuropeanCommunity.[2002] OJ L 80/29.
20 .Seethe recordsofthe third meetingof theWorking Partyof the EuropeanCommission,16-17March 1995.
21 ECJJudgrnentsof 8 hme 1994,CasesC-382/92and C-383192 {.AJmmission v, United Kingdom, [1994] ECRI-2461.
As a result of the resistance of the United Kingdom under
Conservative governments against a Directive on European Works
Councils, the legal base was finally found in Article 2 paragraph 2
of the Agreement on Social Policy, concluded by eleven of the
twelve Member States at the Maastricht Intergovernmental
Conference. After the acceptance of the Social Policy Chapter in
1997 by the Labour Government of the UK, this Chapter became
part of the HC-Treaty in the Treaty of Amsterdam. By an addi-
tional Directive, the scope of the EWC-Directive was extended to
the United Kingdom. Substantially, the Directive can now be con-
sidered to be based on Article 137 of the present EC-Treaty.
Besides the eleven Member States that originally adopted the
Directive, and the United Kingdom that joined in later, the EWC-
Directive is today also applicable in the Member States that joined
the European Union in 1995 (Austria, Finland and Sweden) and
2004 (Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland,
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia). The Directive is also to be
applied in the other countries of the European Economic Area
(Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein). Other countries that enter
the Community (in the near future Bulgaria and Rumania) will
be obliged to introduce the EWC-Directive upon entry as well.
But the EWC-Directive in practice reaches further than the
area of the countries that are formally bound by it. The United
Kingdom experienced this during the period that it fell outside
the scope of the EWC-Directive, while other countries had imple-
mented it. The MNE's that had their headquarters in the United
Kingdom, had to fulfil the requirements of the Directive with
their undertakings on the continent. They were obliged to estab-
lish a European Works Council at least for the establishments in
the continental Member States. But it would have been very
strange for their British employees should they not be represented
in this European Works Council. The opposite applied to the
MNE's who had their central management on the continent, but
also one or more undertakings in the United Kingdom. It would
be awkward to keep their British employees outside their
European Works Council. And when management did not already
think of this, it was certainly brought up by their counterparts
during the negotiations on the agreement that the Directive
requires. Within Great Britain, the unions demanded the same. At
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The Directive also applies to MNE's that have their headquar-
ters outside the Member States, for instance in Switzerland, the
United States of America or Japan. When they have enough
employees in the Member States to meet the requirements of the
Directive, they will have to comply with the Directive at least
with regard to these European establishments. Where the central
management is not situated in a Member State, it will have to act
through their representative agent in a Member State, to be desig-
nated if necessary. In the absence of such a representative, the
management of the establishment or group undertaking with the
greatest number of employees in anyone Member State is regard-
ed as the central management (Article 4).
4. Agreementswithin the framework of the Directive
A Community-scale undertaking will have the following options
in case the employees request negotiations:
a. to conclude an agreement within the framework of the
Directive within three years after the request is made by the
employees;
b. to refuse negotiations and therefore become obliged to apply
the subsidiary requirements six months after the employees'
request;
c. to have to apply the subsidiary requirements three years after
the employees' request in case the negotiations have no result;
d. do nothing at all, in case the SNB terminates the negotiations
itself: In this case, employees can request that negotiations be
restarted, but only after two years.
The employer has no obligation to negotiate aslong as the
employees do not make such a request.
The Directive puts emphasis on the fact that the establishment
of an bWC should be based on an agreement between the central
management and employees' representatives. The first responsi-
bility for the setting-up of an EWC lies with the central manage-
ment. ""'here a group of undertakings is concerned, the central
management is the management of the controlling undertaking.
It shall initiate negotiations on its own initiative or on the written
request of at least 100 employees or their representatives in at least
two undertakings or establishments in at least two different
Member States.
For this purpose a Special Negotiating Body (hereafter: SNB)
shall be established. It has a minimum of three and a maximum
of seventeen members. The election of appointment of the mem-
bers of the SNB will bedetermined in national law. Each Member
State in which the undertaking has establishments should be
represented by at least one member in the SNB. Supplementary
members are added in proportion to the number of employees
working in the establishments, which is laid down by the legisla-
tion of the Member State within the territory of which the central
management is situated.
The SNB has the task of determining, with the central manage-
ment, by written agreement, the scope, composition, functions,
meetings, resources and term of office of the EWC and the
duration of the agreement. Or they have to agree on the arrange-
ments for implementing a procedure for the information and
consultation of employees.
The central management, after being informed of the
composition of the SNB, shall convene a meeting and inform the
local management. The SNB may be assisted by experts of its
choice. Expenses that the SNB needs to carry out its task in an
appropriate manner are borne by the central management, but
Member States may give budgetary rules and limit the funding to
cover one expert only. For the purpose of concluding agreements
the SNB acts by a majority of its members. The SNB may end the
negotiations by a two-thirds majority decision. In this case a new
request to convene the SNB must wait for two years.
Since the Directive does not prescribe the creation of a
European Works Council as such, the central management and
SNB can also decide to establish one or more ICP's instead ofan
EWe. This may be a form of consultation and information with-
out meeting in a council. If they choose to do so, they must do
this in writing, and stipulate by what method the employees'
representatives shall have the right to meet to discuss the informa-
tion conveyed to them. This information shall relate in particular
to transnational questions which significantly affect employees'
interests.
It is not very dear which procedures could be imagined by an
"ICP': Theoretically, one could imagine that employees could
even be informed bye-mail at their workplace, but still they are
supposed to meet to discuss the information.
5. The "subsidiary requirements"
The Directive relies heavily on the willingness of employers and
employees to negotiate on agreements with regard to the EWe.
That willingness will not always be obvious in practice. There
must be pressure on parties to cooperate. Otherwise, the stronger
party, the employer, could just refuse to negotiate or to reach an
agreement. For this situation the Directive knows the notion of
"subsidiary requirements': The Member States have to adopt in
their nationallaw the subsidiary requirements that must satisfy
the provisions set out in an Annex to the Directive.
The subsidiary requirements laid down by the law of the
Member State in which the central management is situated are to
be applied in case the central management refuses to commence
negotiations within six months after a request as mentioned
above. They also are to be applied where, after three years from
the date of this request, parties are unable to conclude an agree-
ment. It is important, that the SNB may not itself decide to end
the negotiations. It has to continue the negotiations until the
three-years term has passed if it wants to see the subsidiary
requirements imposed on the employer. Of course, both parties
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can also decide voluntarily to agree on the application of the
subsidiary requirements.
The subsidiary requirements as set out in the Annex to the
Directive are really "subsidiary" in this sense that various oppor-
tunities are offered in order to avoid the application of them. But
in practice, they will be very important. They will form the basis
of the "subsidiary requirements" to be formulated in the national
legislation of the Member States. And the "subsidiary require-
ments" of the legislation ofthe country where the central
management is situated, will often form the basis of the negotia-
tions of the SNB with the central management. Both parties know
that when they do not condudean agreement within the term of
three years, these rules will be imposed on them. Both will tryto
use the negotiations to modify them in their direction, but know
that they can fall back on them, if they cannot agree in the end.
The subsidiary requirements in the Annex of the Directive
have the following (summarised) features:
I. Establishment, composition and competence:
a the information and consultation'of the E\VC will be limited
to matters which concern at least two establishments in
different Member States;
b the members of the Ewe will be elected or appointed from
among the employees' representatives or, in the absence
thereof, by the entire body of employees in accordance with
national legislation and/or practice;
c the E\VC will have three to 30 members; the larger EWCs
might elect a select committee of at most three members; it
adopts its own rules of procedure;
d each Member State in which establishments are situated
must be represented in the EWe with supplementary mem-
bers in proportion to the numbers ofemployees working in
the different Member States;
e the centralmanagement shall be informed of the
composition of the EWe;
f four years after the establishment of the Ewe it shall
examine whether to open negotiations for theconclusion of
the agreement referred to in Article 6 of the Directive or to
continue to apply the subsidiary requirements.
II. The EWe will meet with the central.management once a year
to be informed and consulted on the basis of a report, drawn
up by the central management, on the progress of business
and prospects, in particular certain specified subjects.
III. In exceptional circumstances affecting the employees' inter-
ests (relocations, closure and collective redundancies), the
select committee or the Ewe will be informed and may
request to meet the central management or a more appro-
priate level of management.
IV. The Member Statesmay lay down rules on the chairing of
the meetings with the management.Before any meeting the
EWeor select committee may meetwithout the manage-
mentbeing present.
V. The members of the EWC inform the representatives of the
employees, or in the absence of representatives the work-
force asa whole, of the content and outcome of the infor-
mation and consultation procedure.
VI. The EWC or select committee may be assisted by experts of
its choice, in so far as this is necessary for it to carry out its
tasks.
VII. The central management provides the EWC with financial
and material resources in order to enable them to perform
their duties in an appropriate manner. In particular, the
costs of meetings, interpretation facilities, accommodation
and travelling expenses shall be met by the central manage-
ment unless otherwise agreed. The Member States may lay
down budgetary rules and in particular limit funding to
cover one expert only.
It may be noted that according to the subsidiary requirements,
the E\VC is only composed of employees' representatives. This is
in line with the system of e.g. Germany, Greece, the Netherlands,
Portugal and Spain. In the system of e.g. Belgium, Denmark,
France and Luxembourg, the employer or even more employers'
representatives are members of the works council. As we read in
the Directive, it is not allowed to implement such a system in the
national legislation ofMember States with regard to the European
Works Council, since Article.7 of the Directive requires that the
subsidiary requirements are satisfied. However, it will be possible
to agree on such a construction between central management and
the SNB.
Finally, the fact that the subsidiary requirements are applied
does not mean that it is not allowed to grant additional rights to
the EvVC. The management of the enterprise may of course give
more information or consult the EWC more often than the
Directive and the national legislation require. It is also possible to
make agreements on these matters. It is to be expected, that in the
course of informingand consulting between the EWe and the
management a relationship develops, that in a atmosphere of
understanding might lead to new arrangements. In orderto work
productively, it would be better not to confine discussions to the
area that is foreseen by formal rules, but to discuss every issue that
is of importance for the workers in more than one country.
6. Cooperation. confidentiality and protection of representatives
Article 9 provides, that the central management and the EWC
shall work in a spirit of cooperation with due regard to their
reciprocal rights and obligations. The same applies in the case of
an ICP.
The Directive also has some clauses on the protection of
confidential information and of the position of employees'
representatives. Under employees' representatives in this respect
are understood members of the EWC, those employees acting
underan ICP, as well as members of the SNB.
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Member States shall provide that employee representatives,
and experts who assist them, are not authorised to reveal any
information which has expressly been provided to them in confi-
dence, even after the expiry of their term of office. Member States
may regulate that the central management in its territory is not
obliged to transmit information when its nature is such that,
according to objective.criteria, it would seriously harm the func-
tioning of the undertakings concerned or would be prejudicial to
them. This will be possible under the conditions and limits laid
down by national legislation. The dispensation may be made
subject to prior administrative or judicial authorisation.
It seems that the notion of "confidentiality" of the country
where the central management is located is applicable to all
members of the EWe. However, the employment· relationships
with the members are (normally) ruled by the legislation of the
country in which each employee works. This implies that in case a
member of the Ewe violates the confidentiality, the employer
could take disciplinary measures against that employee, according
to the employment legislation of his own country.
Particular provisions may be given for the central management
of undertakings which pursue directly and essentially the aim of
ideological guidance with respect to information and the expres-
sion of opinions. 1bis is recognition of the German rules for
"Iendenzbetriebe": institutions like the press and. schools, where
opinions are "part of the business':22However, the condition that
at the date·of the adoption of this Directive such·particular provi-
sions .already must have·existed in national legislation, means that
this provision does not introduce a new general principle of
European labour law. Only practically existing national exceptions
are tolerated. New exceptions on this pointcannot be introduced.
Article 10 provides thatemployees' representatives enjoy, in the
exerciseof their functions, the same protection and guarantees
provided for employees' representatives by the national legislation
and/or practice in force in their country of employment. This
shall apply in particularto attendance of the meetings and the
paymentofwages for members who are on thestaff of the under-
taking for the period'ofabseace necessary for the performance of
their duties .•By referring to the.national legislation .on this point
theDirective makes it easy to protect the employee representatives
in a way thatfits into the national labour lawsystem. This is
possible because all Member States know some form ofsuch
protection. But not just the nationalsystems are varied.also the
degree of protection that is offered. Thisimplies that the different
members ofone singleSNB or EWe, in practice will have
different degrees of protection against disadvantages because
of theirdiverging national systemsof protecting employees'
representatives.
7. Agreements in force
The Directive provides that the obligations arising from this
Directive shall not apply to those undertakings in which, on the
date the Directive should be implemented (September 1996 or
earlier on the date when it has already been transposed by the
Member State in question), there is already an agreement,
covering the entire workforce, providing for the transnational
information and consultation of employees. When such an agree-
ment expires, both parties may jointly decide to renew it. Where
this is not the case, the provisions of the Directive shall apply.
This Article 13 of the Directive was meant to encourage MNE's
to negotiate on agreements already before the obligations arising
from the Directive are imposed on them. An agreement reached
before September 1996 would allow them to escape certain provi-
sions of the Directive that they do not approve of: They could, for
instance, agree on more decentralised (and therefore less costly)
forms of presenting information to employees' representatives.
On the other hand, the employees' representatives, will of course
not give rights awaywhich they consider to be important, know-
ing that they can wait until the Directive will grant them these
rights anyway.But the provision gives both parties some flexibili-
ty, provided that they act fast, and by this it stimulated the process
of introducing the Ewe in practice. Once such an agreement is
working well, the employer has a reason to argue that the parties
can leave it at that and do not need to introduce further reaching
rights based on the Directive. It might be mentioned however,
that when the agreement is concluded for an indefinite period,
either of the parties may give notice according to the applicable
national law. This may be done to enforce new negotiations on an
agreement under the provisions of the EWC-Directive.
In practice, many of these "agreements in force" were conclud-
ed before 22 September 1996. In Germany 100 of the roughly 300
relevant companies had such an agreement, especially in the field
of chemical industries (Bayer AG) and automobile industry
(Volkswagen). In Belgium 57 per cent of the EWe's in 2004 were
based upon an Article 13 agreement, 40 per cent upon an Article
6 agreement, and only two per cent upon the subsidiary require-
ments of the Directive. In Austria twenty of the 45 relevant
companies have an EWe, all based on an agreement and not one
on the subsidiary requirements. These figures suggest that the
subsidiary requirements are not often used. But of course they do
not sayto which extent the content of the agreements differs from
the subsidiary requirements.
In total, 737 MNE'S had installed an Ewe in 2004, which
makes the bWC-Directive a success, although still many compa-
nies which fall under the scope of the Directive did not install an
EWC.
23
22 .Dirk MichaelBurton, llmdenr.schutzprinziphinrekhend berucksichtigt,Arbeitgeber 22/461994,8Q] -803.
23 See for more detailedinformation EuropeanFoundationfor the improvement of Livingand WorkingConditions,EuropeanWorksCouncils in Practice,Dublin 2004and
EuropeanCommission,EuropeanWorksCouncils:fullyrealisingtheir potential for employeeinvolvementfor the benefitof enterprisesand their employees, Brussels2004.
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8. The transposition of the Directive by the Member States
The Directive may be transposed into national law in two ways:
either by legislation or by way of agreement between management
and labour. In practice, both ways are used.
In Austria, Germany and the Netherlands the directive was
transposed by legislation, in Belgium by two inter-industry wide
collective agreements. Germany and the Netherlands chose sepa-
rate Acts, only dealing with European Works Councils (EBRG
respectively WEOR), Austria implemented the Directive in the
Labour Relations Act (Arbeitsverfassungsgesetz).
The EWC-Directive explicitly requires the national regulation
to foresee:
• the concept of"employees' representatives" (Art. 2, para. 1d)
• the calculation methods to determine the size of the workforce
(Art. 2, para. 2)
• the method to be used for the election or appointment of the
members of the SNB to be elected or appointed in that territo-
ry (Art. 5, para. 2a) and of the members of the E\VC (point lb
Annex)
• rules tor the proportionate composition of the SNB (Art. 5,
para. 2c) and EvVC (point Id Annex)
• subsidiary requirements that satisfy the provisions set out in
the Annex to the Directive (Art. 7)
• protection of confidential information (Art. 8, paras. 1 and 2)
• protection of employees' representatives (Art. 10)
• sanctions on compliance with the Directive (Art. 11).
Besides, the transposition also has to provide several provisions of
the Directive itself, such as concepts, obligations, rights, contents
of the agreements and the application ofsubsidiary requirements.
Optionally, it is also possible to regulate:
• that the Directive does not apply to merchant navy crews (Art.
1, para. 5)
• budgetary rules regarding the operation of the SNB (Art. 5,
para. 6) and the EWC (point 7 Annex), including the possibili-
ty of limiting funding to cover one expert only
• particular provisions on undertakings that pursue directly and
essentially the aim of ideological guidance, in case such provi-
sions already existed in national legislation (Art. 8, para. 3)
• rules on the chairing of information and consultation
meetings (point 4 Annex).
The. transposition of the Directive.into national legislation was
not.toe simple, partlybecause ofthe problem that various
national law systems are applicable to theEWCand the persons
participating in it. A orchestration of national transposition legis-
lation therefore was with this Directive very important. For the
discussion oflegal problems and to find common solutions where
24 See the contribution ofWaas in this edition.
necessary, a Working Party on the transposition of Directive
94/45/EC was created by the European Commission with
representatives of all Member States, which met regularly. One of
the conclusions of the Working Party was, that it is necessary to
assure that all national laws transposing the Directive enter into
force simultaneously on 22 September 1996. This would prevent a
situation in which one national law already requires the establish-
ment of an EWC, while another Member State would not have
given the rules and procedures to be followed in that country. In
practice, this was not realised. This goal was not achieved,
the implementation was (completely) realised in Germany
on 1 November 1996, in the Netherlands on 5 February 1997,
in Belgium in August 1998.
Most Member States were not eager to put more burdens on
the enterprises than the Directive already provides for. The coun-
try that would have done otherwise, could have made itself less
attractive for investments. Since the national legislation of the
country where the central management is situated will be most
influential on the MNE's, a far-reaching national legislation
would not attract enterprises to establish their headquarters in
such a country. Therefore, the Member States tended to follow the
minimum requirements of the Directive as closely as possible. As
a result, the national transposition law of the various Member
States is highly comparable, which will also make the working of
the Ewe more comparable.
The sanctions on the compliance with national legislation have
to be arranged in agreement with national legislation and prac-
tice. Although the case law of the European Court of Justice
demands sanctions to be effective and not just symbolical, coun-
tries do have a margin of discretion here. The SNB and the Ewe
will need access to court procedures. In case the employer does
not fulfil his obligations with respect to the functioning of a once
established EWe, it would not be enough if legal recourse was
restricted to (a group of) employees or to unions. Usually the
ordinary labour courts are competent in these matters. In the
Netherlands, it is the Enterprise Chamber of the Court in
Amsterdam, which is also the competent court in co-determina-
tion matters with regard to the right to advice of works councils
on financial and organisational matters. Since the introduction of
the EWC-Directive there have been only three occasions when the
European Court of Justice had to give a preliminary decision, all
related to German cases.
24
Also some cases before domestic courts
in the other countries are reported. An article by Dorssemont will
be published in ECL 2006/1 which discusses French and Belgium
cases, the national reports of Austria and the Netherlands each
mention one case. Besides the Renault cases, most of these issues
dealt with the establishment of the continuation of the EWC
itself. There are not many cases yet on substantial issues. But this
can be explained as a result of the short history of the EWe.
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It is foreseen that the Directive shall be without prejudice to
employees' existing rights to information and consultation under
national law (Alticle 12, para. 2). This is important, because in
some countries the EWC Directive will not impress the existing
works councils very much. In countries like Austria, Germany,
Greece and the Netherlands the rights on information and con-
sultation are further developed and the works councils even have
the right to co-decide certain aspects of personnel policies. They
of course would not welcome the EWC Directive, when it would
bring about a cut on the existing rights to influence MNE's,
acquired under national law. This is not to say that the Directive
will have no influence on national legislation at all. It could set a
minimum standard for national legislators also with respect to
domestic enterprises. On the other hand, the clause mentioned
here might have a preventive effect against the argument that
countries for the sake of competitiveness should bring their legis-
lation back to the European minimum standards.
9. Conclusion
Since Member States had the time to implement the Directive in
national legislation until 1996 and in fact sometimes took longer
and companies may take three years for negotiations on agree-
ments before an EWC will be imposed on them, the amount of
EWCOs that is established at present is encouraging. This is a
result of the strategy to promote the conclusion of agreements in
advance. It seems wise, that the Directive has such a flexible struc-
ture, that many flowers can grow in the field of European employ-
ees' participation.
One could say that the Directive introduces a form of "double
subsidiarity': It firstly promotes the conclusion of agreements
before the expiration of the transposition period, albeit that the
incentive was the negative wish not to have to apply the Directive
at all. As far as this did not work, subsidiary, the Directive obliges
to negotiate for an agreement within more narrow rules and
procedures. If even this does not lead to a result, at last, more
subsidiary, the "subsidiary requirements" are imposed on the
undertaking by the national legislation. The less employer and
employees' representatives can agree among themselves, the more
they are forced by the Directive and the national transposition
legislation. Maybe this is to be considered as a new way of giving
shape to the principle of subsidiarity of the EC-Treaty (Article 5).
It also is called a form of"horizontal subsidiarity", since it is not
subsidiarity between the European and the nationalleve1, but
between different rules on the national and European level..
Although originally the Directive called for an evaluation not
later than 22 September 1999 with a view to proposing suitable
amendments to the Council, where necessary, this evaluation did
not lead to a change in the Directive. This period was too short to
draw conclusions, since the mandatory working of the Directive
had just started at that time, Article 15 of the EWC-Directive also
states that the Commission will in particular examine whether the
workforce size thresholds are appropriate. A minority of the
European Parliament already has promoted this in its (rejected)
amendments on the draft-Directive. It is remarkable, that the
Directive seems to work quite satisfactorily. The national reporters
of this Journal were asked to mention wishes for a change of the
Directive. But the reports mostly go no further than to refer to
these threshold discussions. The Austrian reporter reports a wish
for tougher sanctions, but this is mostly a national matter.
National organisations do not offer clear viewpoints on the
desired changes of the Directive. We will have to rely on the
ETUC and UNICE-reports on this matter?5 The ETUC requires
extended rights for the EWC and the unions, UNICE promotes
consolidation. It gives hope that both parties also produced a
common position to promote the EWC in the new EC-Member
States.26
With the EWC-Directive the standard is set for a European
model of employees' participation, highly influenced by the
German example, but also with specific features, especially the
high flexibility that is found in the Directive. Most important is
that Europe definitely has chosen a two-channel system of
employees' representation with works councils next to trade
unions. This will certainly provoke further discussions on
the relations between the two. After ten years, the EWe's are
established in so many companies that the model cannot be
disregarded anymore, being already an important element of
European labour relations. Now the time has come for EWe's
to develop their influence and to find the way to courts where
necessary to reach real intluence on decision-making in
multinational enterprises.
25 -. ETUCstrategyin viewof the revisionof the EWe Directive adoptedbythe Executive Committee.4--S December2003and final~ment givenbythe SteeringCommitteeon
13February2004;PositionlJNICE 1June 2004,to be found on their respective websites.
26 ETUC and lJNICE, Lessons learnedon European WorksCouncils.1 March2005.
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